UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-17-2018

Valencia v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45998

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Valencia v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45998" (2018). Not Reported. 5121.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5121

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
12/17/2018 12:21 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JULIAN MARTIN VALENCIA,

)
)
NO. 45998
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
CANYON COUNTY NO. CV-2017-466
v.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Respondent.
)
______________________________)
________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9307
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................ 8
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 9
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Valencia’s
Post-Conviction Petition ............................................................................................ 9
A. Introduction

..................................................................................................... 9

B. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Valencia’s
Post-Conviction Petition Because Mr. Valencia Alleged Facts That,
If True, Would Entitle Him To Relief, But The District Court
Erroneously Held That His Claims Were Belied By The Record .......................... 9
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................... 20

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (Ct. App. 2015) ...............................................................................9
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612 (2011)................................................................................... 10, 12
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct. App. 2002)........................................................................9
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139 (Ct. App. 2015) ......................................................................10
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)..............................................................................1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .........................................................................10

Statutes
I.C. § 18-6608 ....................................................................................................................passim
I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) ..................................................................................................................15
I.C. § 19-4906 .............................................................................................................................9

Rules
I.R.C.P. 56 ..................................................................................................................................9
I.C.R. 11 ............................................................................................................................passim

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Julian Valencia appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts the district court erred when it dismissed his
petition without holding an evidentiary hearing because his trial counsel misinformed him about
the consequences of pleading guilty, and the district court rejected that claim based in part on
information that did not come out until the sentencing hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2013, Mr. Valencia entered an Alford1 plea to one count of battery with intent to
commit rape. (R., pp.8, 102.) Prior to sentencing, Mr. Valencia filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. (R., p.8.) The district court denied the motion and imposed a sentence of ten years,
with four years fixed. (R., p.8.) Mr. Valencia appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the
district court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded the case for
further proceedings in 2015. (R., p.9.) Thereafter, a jury trial was held wherein the State alleged
Mr. Valencia committed the crime when the alleged victim was asleep on January 26, 2013.
(See Supp. Record Exhibits, p.35: Tr., p.134, Ls.4-21.)2 That trial ended in a mistrial. (R., p.9.)

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
The district court took judicial notice of several items that were not in the original appellate
record. (R., pp.99-100, 146-47.) As such, undersigned counsel filed an objection to the record,
and the district court granted the objection. (See Supp. Record, pp.28-32.) All citations to these
additional materials will begin with “Supp. Record” and include further detail to identify the
item as necessary. The exhibits, which include, among other things, the transcript from the 2015
trial and the minutes from the change of plea and sentencing hearings, were submitted in one
119-page electronic file. Citations to those exhibits will include the page number of that file and
further detail as necessary.
2

1

Subsequently, Mr. Valencia agreed to plead guilty pursuant to an Idaho Criminal Rule 11
plea agreement; in exchange, the State agreed to amend the battery with intent charge to
aggravated battery,3 dismiss one of five counts of violating a no contact order—third offense,
and recommend concurrent sentences. (R., pp.15-20, 174.) The State also agreed not to file a
persistent violator enhancement or require Mr. Valencia to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.16,
174.) Mr. Valencia then entered Alford pleas to one count of aggravated battery and four counts
of violating a no contact order. (R., pp.9, 174.)
Mr. Valencia filed a timely verified petition for post-conviction relief, an accompanying
“declaration,” and a memorandum in support of the petition. (R., pp.7-49.) He attached his plea
agreement as an exhibit. (R., p.8, 15-20.) In the petition, Mr. Valencia alleged, inter alia, that
his trial attorneys were ineffective because they misrepresented “all of the facts concerning going
to trial [as] opposed to taking the Rule 11 Agreement . . . .” (R., p.10.) He stated that his
attorneys told him about the State’s proposed Rule 11 plea agreement at 4:15 p.m. on the day
before his trial on one of the no contact order violation charges. (R., pp.21-22.) He explained
that his attorneys told him if he did not accept it, the State would dismiss the battery with intent
charge, and charge him instead with forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object, four
counts of violating a no contact order, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.22.) The
trial on the battery with intent charge—in CR-2013-2874—was scheduled for December 15,
2015. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 1:45 - 2:00.)4 Mr. Valencia wrote

3

For the purpose of the plea agreement and the new charge of aggravated battery, the State
consolidated all the charges under one new case number: CR-2015-23313. (R.., pp.15-20; see
also Supp. Record Exhibits, p.85: 12/3/15 Court Minutes.)
4
All citations to the audios of the hearings, which are part of the supplemental record, refer to
the “WMA FORMAT” recordings. There are two recordings from each date; the citations refer
only to the longer recordings. For the change of plea hearing held on December 3, 2015, that
2

that his attorney “stated very clearly” to him that, if he went to trial, the State would be able to
convict him of the forcible penetration charge, and if he was also convicted of one count of
violating a no contact order, this would support the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.22.)
Given that a trial was scheduled for the next morning, he said he “reluctantly” told his
attorneys he would accept the plea agreement. (R., p.22.) The next day, however, due to his
lingering doubts about taking the agreement, he told one of his attorneys he had changed his
mind and wanted to proceed to trial. (R., pp.22-23.) He explained he was “adamant” about his
feelings when first he spoke with his attorney, so his attorney met with the prosecutor to discuss
the situation. (R., p.23.) He stated his attorneys informed him that if he did not accept the plea
agreement, the State would charge him, and he could be convicted under the forcible penetration
statute, I.C. § 18-6608. (R., p.23.) Mr. Valencia asserted that, based on the conversations he had
with his attorney, and his attorney’s conversations with the prosecutor, he again agreed to the
Rule 11 plea agreement. (R., p.23.)
He also claimed that his attorneys’ advice was erroneous because they did not realize the
statute at issue had been amended after the alleged crime took place in 2013, and he could not
have been convicted under the statute that was in effect when the crime was allegedly
committed. (R., pp.23-24.) He asserted that his attorneys “were ineffective by stating the
incorrect standard regarding I.C. 18-6608 rather than what applied to me under the statute prior
to the 2014 amendment.” (R., p.24.) He also stated that, but for his attorneys’ errors, he would
not have accepted the plea agreement. (R., p.24.) Mr. Valencia expanded on this argument in
the memorandum in support of his petition, asserting: “Petitioner here was provided advice 5 by

recording is just over one hour. For the sentencing hearing held on December 15, 2015, that
recording is just over 42 minutes.
5
Quotes from Mr. Valencia’s pro se filings have been corrected for spelling errors.
3

Counsel to plead guilty due to Counsel blatantly erroneous reading of the law in respects to
Idaho Code Section 18-6608 and its application at the time the alleged crime occurred.”
(R., p.39.) He went on to state that the prejudice in his case was clear because “the outcome of
the plea process would have been different with competent advice.” (R., pp.39-40.)
The district court appointed counsel for Mr. Valencia. (R., pp.72-73.) Thereafter, the
State filed an answer (R., pp.76-78), and Mr. Valencia’s appointed counsel filed an amended
petition. (R., pp.90-93.) In that petition, post-conviction counsel reiterated that trial counsel was
ineffective for misadvising Mr. Valencia as to the statute in effect at the time the alleged crime
was committed in 2013 and incorporated the allegations in the original petition. (R., p.92.) The
State then filed another answer. (R., pp.96-98.)
On the same day, the district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.102-110.) It
stated, “Valencia failed to allege facts that show how counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.”

(R., p.108.)

Specifically, the court wrote that

Mr. Valencia’s “attorney [was] under no obligation to inform the Petitioner about the code
except as it relates to the charge at issue. Even if Petitioner claims he was not advised of the
elements of the offense being threatened, he failed to establish how failing to familiarize
Petitioner with the code was deficient performance.” (R., p.109.) The district court also stated,
“Valencia’s allegation that he was unaware of the amended code section is not supported by the
record as he indicated he was pleading guilty to avoid having to register as a sex offender and to
avoid a persistent violator enhancement.” (R., p.109.) The district court concluded: “The record
disproves Valencia’s allegation that Counsel failed to inform him of the elements or the
amendments. Both parties addressed it at both hearings, and although the State felt Valencia’s

4

actions would have allowed the State to charge him under the statute prior to the amendments, it
simply chose not to.” (R., p.109.)
The district court also stated that Mr. Valencia “failed to allege facts demonstrating how
this affected his decision to plead guilty.” (R., p.109.) It reviewed Mr. Valencia’s statements at
the change of plea hearing and stated, “[T]he Court examined Valencia and determined that he
was acting because he wanted to take advantage of the plea agreement to avoid registering as a
sex offender and a persistent violator enhancement.” (R., pp.109-10.)
Mr. Valencia then filed a response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss,
clarifying how trial counsel’s performance was deficient:
Because the crime occurred in 2013 and the victim was sleeping when the alleged
sexual battery occurred, a defense was available to him if he were to have argued
to a jury that the State could not meet the elements of Forcible Sexual Penetration
by use of a Foreign Object on the basis of the victim’s unconsciousness. His
lawyer’s failure to notify him of the change of the statute did not allow him to
make a knowing and intelligent decision to plead guilty in the matter because he
believed, based on the Amended Statute from 2014 that was read to him,
precluded a defense that could have been brought. The failure to advise him that
the charge he would have been charged with was defensible was a material
deficiency in performance . . . .
(R., pp.114-15.)
Additionally, he argued that the failure to advise him about the amended statute was “structural
fundamental error.” (R., pp.115-17.) One month later, the State filed a motion for dismissal
based on the notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.157.) Thereafter, Mr. Valencia’s post-conviction
counsel filed a supplemental response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss in which
he provided further authority and argument with respect to the deficiency prong of the
ineffectiveness claim. (R., pp.165-67.) At that point, both parties stipulated to the district court
ruling on the issue. (R., pp.171-72.)

5

Subsequently, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Valencia’s petition.
(R., pp.174-81.) It stated, “Valencia asserts that he pled guilty because the State threatened to
charge him under the forcible penetration statute using the new language which was added after
the acts took place.”

(R., p.179.)

It concluded this claim was “belied by the record.”

(R., p.179.) Referring to the sentencing hearing, the district court wrote, “Valencia told the
Court he was ‘confused’ and wanted to go to trial ‘on the charges that are being brought forth
against me.’ However, the charges brought against him were five counts of violation of a NCO
and Battery with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, to wit: Rape—not Forcible Sexual
Penetration by use of a Foreign Object.” (R., p.179.)
The court noted that, at the sentencing hearing, the State explained it had “contemplated
pursuing a forcible penetration charge, but after discussions with Valencia’s counsel, decided
against it.” (R., pp.179-80.) It went on to state, “Therefore, because the State did not bring the
charge, Valencia could not have been tried on it. Valencia’s allegation that he was ‘precluded
from asserting a defense that was in fact available to him’ is not supported by the record. As
explained by [the prosecutor] at the hearing, all parties were aware of the reasons that the State
could not—and did not—bring the new charge.” (R., p.180.)
The district court also stated, “Valencia’s allegation is further belied by the record as he
eventually explained to the Court that he was pleading guilty to avoid a persistent violator
enhancement and a requirement to register as a sex offender.” (R., p.180.) It went on to hold
that the Rule 11 plea agreement, the guilty plea advisory form, and the change of plea and
sentencing hearings “all reflect that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily—not the result
of threat or coercion.” (R., pp.180-81.) Finally, it stated that the “perceived threat did not exist,
as the State explained” and wrote that, because the State would have tried him on the original

6

charges and not the threatened charge, Mr. Valencia “cannot be precluded from asserting a
defense that would not have been available to him in the first place.” (R., p.181.) Based on this
reasoning, it held Mr. Valencia had “failed to establish trial counsel’s deficient performance or
prejudice and the claim is subject to dismissal.” (R., p.181.) Mr. Valencia filed a notice of
appeal timely from the district court’s order dismissing his petition. (R., pp.183-85, 194-96.)

7

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Valencia’s post-conviction petition?

8

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Valencia’s Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
Mr. Valencia alleged facts to support his claim that his trial attorneys were deficient, and

that this deficiency prejudiced him. Therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his trial attorneys were ineffective. However, instead of holding an evidentiary hearing,
the district court erroneously held that his claims were belied by the record.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Valencia’s Post-Conviction
Petition Because Mr. Valencia Alleged Facts That, If True, Would Entitle Him To Relief,
But The District Court Erroneously Held That His Claims Were Belied By The Record
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.

Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct. App. 2002). “Summary dismissal of an application
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.”
Id. A trial court can summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief only “if it appears
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 701
(Ct. App. 2015).
Otherwise, when “the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not
be summarily dismissed.” Id. at 702. Indeed, “[i]f a genuine issue of material fact is presented,
an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues.” Id. On an appeal from
an order of summary dismissal, this Court applies the same standards used by the trial court and

9

considers whether the petitioner asserts facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief.
Id. The Court exercises free review over questions of law. Id.
An applicant can prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if he shows that his
attorney’s performance was deficient, and he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct. App. 2015). A
defendant can demonstrate that an attorney’s performance was deficient if he shows “that the
attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Booth v. State,
151 Idaho 612, 618 (2011). When a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process
and enters a plea based on the advice of counsel, “the voluntariness of the plea depends on
whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.” Id. “Specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Id.
In Booth, for example, counsel “erroneously advised Booth that he would be subject to a
mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to trial and the State’s special verdict form was
presented to the jury.” Id. at 617. The Court stated that “an attorney engages in deficient
performance by rendering advice regarding potential penalties during the plea process that is
inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous provisions of a sentencing statute.” Id. at 619. The
Court ultimately held counsel’s incorrect advice to Mr. Booth based on his misreading of statutes
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 620.
In this case, Mr. Valencia alleged his trial attorneys were ineffective because they
misrepresented the facts concerning going to trial as opposed to entering the plea agreement.
(R., p.10.) He supported that claim with facts. He stated that his attorneys presented the terms
of the plea agreement to him verbally and told him that, if he did not accept the agreement, the

10

State “would then proceed with all 4 counts” of a no contact order violation, “file the persistent
violator,” and “dismiss the Battery with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony To Wit: Rape, and
file a new charge of Forcible Sexual Penetration by Use of Foreign Object.” (R., pp.21-22.) He
also stated that one of his attorneys “stated very clearly to me that based upon all the discovery
that he had gone through the state would in fact get a conviction” for the forcible penetration
charge. (R., p.22.) Additionally, he asserted he was told that, if the State could also prove one
count of violation of a no contact order, “the State would then be able to get a conviction for
persistent violator . . . .” (R., p.22.)
Mr. Valencia also alleged that, during his conversation with his attorneys, they told him
the State “would be able to prove this crime specifically upon the discovery and in where
I.C. § 18-6608(4) states, ‘Where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act
because the victim: (a) Was unconscious or asleep; or (b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving
or cognizant that the act occurred.’” (R., p.23.) He stated his attorneys “were both informing me
in respect to the above statute as it was presented to me that the state would gain a conviction.”
(R., p.23.) He stated that had his attorneys “taken the time to check the statute they would have
found that the state was attempting to get retrospective application of I.C. § 18-6608 . . . .”
(R., p.23.) And finally, he wrote, “Therefore, [his attorneys] were ineffective by stating the
incorrect standard regarding I.C. § 18-6608 rather that what applied to me under the statute prior
to the 2014 amendment, all prior to me agreeing to accept the Rule 11 Plea Agreement.”
(R., p.24 (emphasis in original).)
Mr. Valencia’s factual support for his allegations as to his attorneys’ failure to analyze
the statute accurately and advise him correctly would entitle him to relief, as it shows the
attorneys’ conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Indeed, his attorneys’

11

advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. He
could not enter a voluntary and intelligent plea if he was misinformed as to the potential
consequences of not entering the plea. In other words, the facts that Mr. Valencia presented
showed that his plea was not valid because he was misadvised as to the strength of the State’s
case had it elected to follow through on the threat Mr. Valencia’s attorneys told him it was
making.
The advice given Mr. Valencia’s attorneys fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness because the advice was the result of a failure to research the applicability of the
relevant statute to the facts of the case. Specifically, his attorneys failed to realize—when they
advised Mr. Valencia about the State’s threatened charge—that I.C. § 18-6608 was not amended
to include Section 4 until 2014, after the alleged crime in this case was committed. In other
words, the section that may have applied to the acts alleged by the State, was not added until
2014. (See R., pp.10-11, 21-24, 32-33, 178-79.) Before that addition was made, the statute did
not include any language about the victim being “unconscious” or “asleep.” Therefore, the
statute, prior to the 2014 amendment, did not apply to the acts the State alleged.
Mr. Valencia also alleged facts to show that he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ deficient
advice. A defendant demonstrates prejudice if he shows “‘a reasonable probability that the
outcome of trial would be different but for counsel’s deficient performance.’” Booth, 151 Idaho
at 621. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. The “relevant inquiry” is whether, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant “would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 622.
Here, Mr. Valencia specifically stated, “But for [his attorneys’] unprofessional errors in
failing to look up the statute that was in place when I was charged . . . they would have found

12

that the current statute of 18-6608 they were advising me on was not what was in effect at the
time of the alleged crime, I would not have taken the Rule 11 Plea Agreement as was being
presented to me.” (R., p.24.) Referring to this section in his declaration, Mr. Valencia also
stated he had “demonstrated the outcome of the plea process would have been different with
competent advice.” (R., p.40.) Therefore, Mr. Valencia’s petition and supporting documents
alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief because his statements showed there was at
least a reasonable probability that, had counsel not misadvised him as to the statute’s
applicability, he would not have entered the plea agreement. As such, this presented a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether his counsel was ineffective, so the district court should not
have summarily dismissed his petition. Rather, it should have held an evidentiary hearing on the
issue.
Instead, the district court dismissed the petition after finding that Mr. Valencia’s claims
were belied by the record. (R., pp.178-81.) However, none of the facts the district court pointed
to actually belied his allegations. For example, the district court relied on the sentencing hearing.
It noted that Mr. Valencia said at that hearing that he felt “the State ‘was being unfair’ and
‘abusing its authority’ by threatening to file additional charges.” (R., p.179.) It also noted that
Mr. Valencia “told the Court he was ‘confused’ and wanted to go to trial ‘on the charges that are
being brought forth against me.’” (R., p.179.) These statements showed Mr. Valencia wanted to
go to trial on the original charge as he had done before6 but was “confused” because of the
State’s threat to bring a different charge if he did not plead guilty. As such, the statements
actually supported his allegations on post-conviction. However, the district court found his
claim was meritless because “the charges brought against him were five counts of violation of a

6

See also (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 1:40 – 2:00 and 3:45 – 4:05.)
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NCO and Battery with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, to wit: Rape—not Forcible
Penetration by use of a Foreign Object.” (R., p.179.) While this is true, it is irrelevant because it
does disprove Mr. Valencia’s allegation that he pleaded guilty because he thought, based on
counsel’s erroneous advice, that the State could still dismiss the charge that he wanted to take to
trial and file the threatened charge.
The district court also relied on the fact that, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor
“addressed the Court regarding the ‘potential other charge,’” and the prosecutor “contemplated
pursuing a forcible penetration charge, but after discussions with Valencia’s counsel, decided
against it.” (R., pp.179-80.) The court noted that the prosecutor “explained that the State did not
believe it could have brought the charge based on the case law, the statute at the time the crime
took place, and its subsequent amendment.” (R., p.180.) It then stated, “Therefore, because the
State did not bring the charge, Valencia could not have been tried on it.” (R., p.180.) Again, this
was not the relevant inquiry. The prosecutor’s statements at the sentencing hearing have no
bearing on what Mr. Valencia’s counsel told him the State would do if he did not plead guilty.
And they do not show that Mr. Valencia understood the State would not ultimately pursue the
new charge if he did not plead guilty.
Nevertheless, the district court stated, “As explained by [the prosecutor] at the hearing,
all parties were aware of the reasons that the State could not—and did not—bring the new
charge.” (R., p.180.) But there is no indication Mr. Valencia was made aware of these reasons
when he chose to plead guilty almost two weeks earlier. Indeed, the statements made by
Mr. Valencia and his counsel at both hearings indicate that he was not told about this before he
pleaded guilty. Whether the State ultimately brought the charge is not the issue; the issue is
whether Mr. Valencia was told by his attorneys that the State was not going to bring the charge
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at the time he pleaded guilty. Whether his attorneys told him that was a genuine issue of
material fact, which required an evidentiary hearing to resolve.
The district court also stated that Mr. Valencia’s claim was “further belied by the record
as he explained to the Court that he was also pleading guilty to avoid a persistent violator
enhancement and a requirement to register as a sex offender.” (R., p.180.) It wrote that, at the
change of plea hearing, “Valencia remarked he was ‘under duress’ and noted that “there was a
short amount of time and notification if proceeded today, he would be subject to the Persistent
Violator . . .” (R., p.180.) But Mr. Valencia also said he was aware of “the potential dismissal of
the case on the battery issue and then refiled as a different issue.” (Supp. Record: Audio
Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 40:30 – 40:45.) Nevertheless, the court stated, “After further
examination, the Court determined Valencia was acting to take advantage of the plea agreement
to avoid the persistent violator enhancement and registering as a sex offender.” (R., p.180.)
However, Mr. Valencia’s statements to that effect could apply to either the original charge or the
new charge—both would require registration upon conviction. See I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a). The
district court also stated, “Valencia then agreed that he entered the plea knowingly and
voluntarily and was not under duress.” (R., p.180.) But if Mr. Valencia was under the mistaken
impression that the State could bring the new charge and get a conviction on it, then he would be
under the impression that he was entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily.
The district court went on to state that Mr. Valencia’s claim was also “belied by the
record” because “The Rule 11 Agreement, Guilty Plea Advisory Form, and the change of plea
and sentencing hearings all reflect that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily—not the
result of threat or coercion.

The perceived threat did not exist as the State explained.”

(R., pp.180-81.) Again, the prosecutor’s statements at the sentencing hearing do not prove that
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the “perceived threat did not exist” because they do not prove that his attorneys told
Mr. Valencia, prior to him pleading guilty, that the State could not pursue the other charge—or
that he had a defense if the State did pursue it—if Mr. Valencia did not accept the plea
agreement. The facts as alleged by Mr. Valencia were sufficient, if taken as true, to survive
summary dismissal.
Further, the Rule 11 plea agreement and Guilty Plea Advisory show that Mr. Valencia
was concerned about the State dismissing the original charge and filing the new charge. In the
Rule 11 plea agreement, an additional handwritten term was added that read as follows: “No
other charges can be filed by the state with regards to any conduct provided in any of the reports
in case no(s) CR-15-21619/20659/16500 & CR-13-5380/2874-C.” (R., p.19.) Similarly, in the
Guilty Plea Advisory Form, in response to question number 15, which asked about his
understanding of the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Valencia wrote, “State would not dismiss
Batt w/Intent to file another charge.”7 (Supp. Record Exhibits, p.111.) Also, in answering
question number 14, which asked if there were other reasons he could not make a “reasoned and
informed decision,” Mr. Valencia wrote, “Duress.” (Supp. Record Exhibits, p.111.) These
statements indicate that, when he pleaded guilty, Mr. Valencia was still under the impression that
the State could file the new charge if he did not plead guilty.
Finally, the district court’s statement that the change of plea and sentencing hearings
show that the “perceived threat did not exist” (R., pp.180-81) is not supported by the comments
of Mr. Valencia and his attorney at those hearings. Mr. Valencia’s attorney, when telling the
court why Mr. Valencia decided to accept the plea agreement, said Mr. Valencia was concerned

7

Mr. Valencia’s counsel said that, other than the last page of the agreement, Mr. Valencia
completed the Guilty Plea Advisory Form by himself. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of
12/3/15 hearing at 36:15 – 36:45.)
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about a persistent violator enhancement, and “Additionally, I had conversations with [the
prosecutor] about the State’s potentially . . . dismissing and filing a different charge. I think that
also played a role in that.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 8:00 – 8:25.)
He went on to say, “I’m not saying the State was going to, we just had conversations about them
having the ability to do so.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 8:25 – 8:35.)
The prosecutor then said, “I just want to clarify for purposes of the record since the persistent
violator was the issue that precipitated the defendant being allowed to withdraw his plea last
time, that the State indicated that, should he be convicted in the no contact order case that was set
for trial today, that the State would file the persistent violator in the battery with intent charge
prior to sentencing . . . .” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 8:30 – 8:55.)
However, when the district court asked why Mr. Valencia wrote that he was under duress
in the Guilty Plea Advisory form, Mr. Valencia said he wrote that because, “just the short
amount of time, and just the notification that I was aware that if I was to proceed today, I would
be subject to the persistent violator if found guilty. I’m aware of that, as well as the potential
dismissal of the case on the battery issue and then refiled as a different issue.” (Supp. Record:
Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 40:05 – 40:55.) Thus, it is evident that Mr. Valencia
believed the State could ultimately elect to dismiss the original charge and file the new charge if
he did not plead guilty.
At that point, the district court said it could not accept his plea unless he was entering it
voluntarily, and Mr. Valencia confirmed that he was entering it voluntarily, and he wanted to
take advantage of the plea agreement and avoid registering as a sex offender. (Supp. Record:
Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 40:55 – 41:40.)

When asked again, Mr. Valencia

acknowledged that he was not entering the plea under duress. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording
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of 12/3/15 hearing at 43:25 – 43:40.) However, when the court asked if Mr. Valencia was
entering his pleas to take advantage of the plea agreement, his counsel said, “Judge, I think
we’ve put on the record several times, there’s lots of reasons why my client is entering this plea,
it’s just to avoid consequences of conviction, initial charges, different charges, it’s a culmination
of everything.”

(Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 55:15 – 56:25.)

At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, Mr. Valencia told the district court that his
attorney came to him on December 2nd, “giving me an hour to decide, saying that the
prosecution would dismiss this battery with intent and file another charge that they could
potentially find me guilty of, and to me, Your Honor, that’s not fair.” (Supp. Record: Audio
Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 1:10 – 1:35.) He also said, “Since the court already knows that
I was pretty adamant to going to trial on the battery with intent . . . for her to give that option and
try to dismiss it and file something else that they can potentially find me guilty on, to me, that’s
vindictive prosecution.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 1:40 – 2:00.)
The district court told Mr. Valencia the State could bring any charge it felt was justified under
the facts. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 2:10 – 2:20.) Subsequently,
Mr. Valencia said he was “confused” when he entered his plea, and he wanted to withdraw his
plea and “be allowed to go to jury trial on the charges that are brought forth against” him. (Supp.
Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 3:45 – 4:05.)
At that point, the prosecutor said there were conversations with Mr. Valencia’s attorney
about filing the new charge, but she was aware that she likely could not do so based on the
statute prior to its amendment. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 4:30 –
5:15.) She said she told Mr. Valencia’s attorney that it was “very unlikely that the State would
be pursuing those charges . . . but it was certainly something that we did look at.” (Supp.
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Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 5:10 – 5:30.) She went on to say, “The grounds
that the defendant is raising with regards to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea were all
covered in great depth” at the change of plea hearing. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of
12/15/15 hearing at 6:45 – 7:00.) The district court then denied Mr. Valencia’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 8:00 – 10:15.)
The record as a whole does not show that Mr. Valencia was told by his attorneys, prior to
pleading guilty, that the State would not dismiss the original charge and refile the new charge.
Further, it does not show that Mr. Valencia understood that he could not have been guilty of the
threatened charge because the statute had been amended after the alleged crime was committed.
As such, the record does not disprove Mr. Valencia’s allegations. Since the facts Mr. Valencia
alleged, if true, would have entitled him to relief, he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his attorneys were ineffective. Therefore, the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Valencia respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s judgment
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand the case for an evidentiary
hearing.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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